Many text-message programs publish SMS terms and conditions with an arbitration clause and a class action waiver. The clause is there for the day a subscriber sues under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.
In a run of rulings from 2022 to 2026, courts declined to send those suits to arbitration. The clause was rarely the problem. The sign-up form did not show that the subscriber had agreed to the document the clause was in.
Text sign-up rulings at a glance
Four rulings between 2022 and 2026 denied arbitration in suits over marketing calls and texts, each for a different defect in the form or the proof.
The table lists the rulings. We read the Ninth Circuit opinion in Berman in full. The three district court rulings are known to us through a law firm summary and two TCPAWorld reports, which we opened; we have not read those opinions themselves.
All four arose from claims about telemarketing calls or texts. In each, the company or its lead seller had terms containing an arbitration clause.
| Ruling | Court and date | Form | Why arbitration was denied |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berman v. Freedom Financial Network | Ninth Circuit, 5 April 2022 | Lead-generation pages offering gift cards and samples | Notice in tiny gray type; continue button did not signal assent |
| Gilliam v. Prince Health | M.D. Tenn., 16 April 2025 (reported by TCPAWorld) | Insurance lead form on a third-party site | Plaintiff testified he never visited the site; motion denied pending further proceedings |
| Preminger v. Red Robin International | M.D. Fla., 6 April 2026 (reported by TCPAWorld) | Loyalty sign-up with a text opt-in | Customer attested to the loyalty terms; the arbitration clause was in separate SMS terms |
| Wong v. LaserAway | N.D. Cal., 15 July 2026 (reported by Kilpatrick) | Website questionnaire collecting a phone number | Clicking get more info did not unambiguously show assent |
Why do SMS terms end up in front of a judge?
Because the arbitration clause in the SMS terms is usually the first thing a company raises when a subscriber files a class action over texts.
A text-message suit is typically filed as a proposed class action. A valid arbitration clause with a class waiver would move the named plaintiff's claim out of court. So the first motion is often a motion to compel arbitration.
That motion puts the sign-up form on trial before anything else. Under the Ninth Circuit's rule, repeated in Chabolla v. ClassPass in 2025, the party seeking arbitration must prove the existence of an agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. The company has to show what the form looked like and what the subscriber did.
Sign-up forms for text programs are built by marketing teams to convert. The fields are short, the button is large and the legal text is small. Those are the features courts have found wanting.
Is consent to receive texts the same as agreeing to the SMS terms?
No. One is permission to be contacted under the calling rules, and the other is a contract, and each has its own test.
The FCC's rule defines prior express written consent as a written agreement bearing the signature of the person called that clearly authorizes the seller to deliver advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice. The agreement must disclose that the person is not required to sign as a condition of purchase. The rule says a signature includes an electronic form recognized under federal or state law.
That definition is about whether the message may be sent. It says nothing about arbitration. Whether the subscriber also agreed to a separate terms document is a question of state contract law, answered with the notice-and-assent test courts apply to any online agreement.
A form can satisfy one and fail the other. In the LaserAway ruling, as Kilpatrick reports it, the plaintiff had provided her phone number through the questionnaire, and the dispute before the court was only whether clicking the button bound her to the terms. It did not.
The reverse can also happen. A subscriber may be bound by terms accepted at account creation and still have a claim that texts continued after a stop request. Both the Red Robin and LaserAway plaintiffs alleged that texts kept coming after they asked for them to stop.
What went wrong on these forms?
The notice was hard to see, the button meant something other than agreement, or the wrong document was attached to the customer's attestation.
In Berman, the pages were run by a lead-generation company. Between a large box and a large green continue button sat two lines of tiny gray type saying the visitor understood and agreed to the terms and conditions, which included mandatory arbitration. The links were not in a distinguishing color. The Ninth Circuit held the notice was not reasonably conspicuous and that clicking continue did not unambiguously manifest assent.
The court also dealt with an argument companies still make: that the notice itself mentioned arbitration. It said the question was whether the plaintiffs could be deemed to have assented to any of the terms in the first place.
In Wong v. LaserAway, according to Kilpatrick's summary, the court assumed the notice was probably visible enough. The form failed on the second step. A button labeled get more info could reasonably be read as a request for information before any agreement. The court applied Berman's rule that a click shows assent only if the person is explicitly told that clicking constitutes assent.
Kilpatrick's summary lists the cases the company relied on and says the court distinguished them because in each the interface explicitly tied the click to acceptance of the terms.
What is the two-document problem?
It arises when a form links to general terms and to separate SMS terms, and the customer is asked to accept only the general ones.
The Red Robin ruling is the clearest example. As TCPAWorld reports it, the customer joined a restaurant loyalty program on the company's website in November 2020 and opted in to texts on the same form. The page linked to two documents with similar names: loyalty program terms, which had no arbitration clause, and SMS terms and conditions, which did.
Directly above the submit button, a statement said that by selecting submit the customer attested to having read the terms and conditions. That statement linked only to the loyalty terms. The link to the SMS terms was bright red and visible, yet nothing asked the customer to read or accept that document.
The court treated the flow as browsewrap as far as the SMS terms were concerned and, applying Florida law, found the customer was not on inquiry notice of the arbitration provision. TCPAWorld describes the layout as a two-link trap: a reasonable person would assume that reading the terms they were asked to attest to was enough.
The fix TCPAWorld's author draws is narrow. Where there are several terms documents, the arbitration provision should appear in, or be clearly tied to, every document the customer is asked to accept.
What if the form belongs to a lead seller?
Then the buyer depends on the seller's page design and on proof that this person actually filled in that page.
Berman was a lead-generation case. The arbitration clause in the lead company's terms covered disputes about telemarketing calls or texts from the company or its marketing partners. The businesses that used the leads sought to rely on it, and the motion failed with the page.
Gilliam v. Prince Health, a Middle District of Tennessee ruling of 16 April 2025 reported by TCPAWorld, shows a second weakness. The defendant had bought the lead through a chain of two sellers. It offered a visual rendering of the web session showing the plaintiff's details being typed into the form. The plaintiff testified at deposition that he had never visited the site.
As TCPAWorld reports it, the court found the defendant had met its initial burden and still denied the motion, because the sworn denial put formation in dispute. The Federal Arbitration Act provides that when the making of the arbitration agreement is in issue, the court proceeds summarily to trial on that question, with a jury if the opposing party demands one.
A Ninth Circuit memorandum of 4 November 2026 adds a recent example of lead-form design. In a data-breach case, the panel affirmed the denial of arbitration for quote-request forms run by LendingTree and QuoteWizard, pointing to tiny type, cluttered pages and a terms link placed well below the button. The disposition is unpublished and is not precedent.
What about keyword opt-ins and paper sign-ups?
We did not open a ruling on those flows, so this post cannot say how courts have treated them.
Many text programs enroll people who send a keyword to a short code, or who write a number on a card at a counter. No web page is involved, and the SMS terms usually reach the subscriber as a link in a confirmation message after enrollment.
The rulings above all concern web forms. The general test they apply, notice of the terms and an act that unambiguously shows assent to them, is stated as the rule for contracts formed on inquiry notice. How a court would apply it to a reply keyword is a question we cannot answer from the sources we opened.
One point from the web cases carries over as a matter of logic. No authority we opened states it. Terms first delivered after the person has enrolled raise the same question as changed terms: what did the person do, after being told, that shows agreement. Counsel should be asked before relying on an arbitration clause delivered that way.
Check a text sign-up form against these points
Tie the button to the terms by name, put the clause in the document the customer accepts, and keep proof of the form and of the person.
The table pairs each defect from the rulings with a check you can run on a live form. It is a review aid drawn from those rulings. It does not say a form that passes would be enforced, and the rulings come from a small number of courts.
Run the checks on a phone as well as on a desktop. Berman records that one of the two plaintiffs registered on a mobile phone, and the court assessed the page as she saw it.
| Defect in the ruling | What to check | Ruling |
|---|---|---|
| Notice smaller and fainter than everything else | Compare the notice with the other text on the form, on a phone | Berman |
| Button label unrelated to agreement | The notice should say that clicking the named button means agreement to the named terms | Wong v. LaserAway; Berman |
| Attestation linked to the wrong document | Open every link in the acceptance statement and confirm the clause is in that document | Red Robin |
| Two terms documents with similar names | Have the customer accept both by name, or put the clause in both | Red Robin |
| No proof the person used the form | Keep evidence that ties the submission to the person, beyond a typed name | Gilliam v. Prince Health |
| Reliance on a seller's page | Obtain the page as displayed and the seller's record for each lead | Berman; Gilliam |
Common questions
Do SMS terms and conditions need an arbitration clause?
Nothing in the sources we opened requires one. Companies add the clause by choice, to move disputes out of court. Whether to have one, and how it is drafted, is a decision for counsel.
Does checking a consent box for texts also accept the SMS terms?
Only if the box or the text beside it says so. The FCC's definition of prior express written consent concerns authorization to send telemarketing messages. Agreement to a terms document is a separate contract question, and courts look for a statement that the action means agreement to those terms.
Why did the LaserAway arbitration motion fail?
As Kilpatrick reports the 15 July 2026 ruling, the button on the questionnaire read get more info. The Northern District of California held that clicking it did not unambiguously show assent, because it could be read as a request for information before any agreement.
Why did the Red Robin arbitration motion fail?
As TCPAWorld reports the 6 April 2026 ruling, the sign-up form asked the customer to attest to the loyalty program terms, which had no arbitration clause. The clause was in separate SMS terms that were linked on the page and never tied to the attestation. The court found no inquiry notice of the arbitration provision.
Can a lead buyer enforce the arbitration clause on the lead seller's website?
It has been tried, with mixed results that depend on the wording of the clause and the proof. In Berman the clause referred to marketing partners and the motion failed on the page design. In Gilliam a sworn denial of ever visiting the site defeated the motion. This post does not cover who may enforce a clause as a non-signatory.
Is a session replay enough to prove someone filled in the form?
In Gilliam, as reported, a visual rendering of the session met the defendant's initial burden and the motion was still denied once the plaintiff swore he never visited the site. A replay shows that a form was completed. It may not settle who completed it.
Do these rulings mean SMS terms are never enforceable?
No. They are four rulings from a few courts on particular forms, and the same courts enforce terms where the form explicitly ties a click to acceptance. Kilpatrick's summary of LaserAway notes that the court distinguished cases on that basis.
Reviewed November 13, 2026
Consentra is software. Nothing on this site is legal advice, and using Consentra does not by itself make a business compliant with any law or carrier rule. Whether a rule applies to your business is a question for your counsel.
Sources
- Ninth Circuit: Berman v. Freedom Financial Network, No. 20-16900 (5 April 2022)
- Kilpatrick: California federal court rules on clicking a lead-form button, Wong v. LaserAway (July 2026)
- National Law Review: Get more info is not agreement, Northern District of California rejects arbitration
- TCPAWorld: Red Robin denied arbitration, multiple terms and conditions defeat motion when attested link lacks arbitration (10 April 2026)
- TCPAWorld: Another arbitration loss, lead buyers and litigators who deny visiting websites (17 April 2025)
- Ninth Circuit: Chabolla v. ClassPass, No. 23-15999 (27 February 2025)
- Ninth Circuit: Memorandum, In re Snowflake data security breach litigation, No. 25-7045 (4 November 2026)
- Cornell Legal Information Institute: 47 CFR 64.1200, delivery restrictions (opened 12 November 2026)
- Cornell Legal Information Institute: 9 U.S.C. 4, failure to arbitrate under agreement (opened 12 November 2026)
