For years, the working answer was yes. The FCC said a text was a call, courts went along, and Do Not Call lawsuits over marketing texts became a common kind of TCPA case.
On 14 July 2026 a federal appeals court said no, at least for one section of the statute. Other courts had already split on the point, and another appeals court has the question in front of it. This post explains what was decided, what was left alone, and why the answer now depends on where a case is filed.
The split at a glance
One appeals court has ruled that texts are outside the private Do Not Call claim, another has the question pending, and district courts have gone both ways.
The table lists the decisions named in the sources we read. It is not a complete census. Fox Rothschild's count of about 29 district court decisions since the Supreme Court's McLaughlin ruling does not name most of them, and new decisions arrive every month.
Note the column for the section at issue. Several decisions that are quoted for the proposition that a text is a call were decided under 227(b), the autodialer section, which uses different words.
| Court | Case and date | Section | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seventh Circuit | Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, 14 July 2026 | 227(c)(5) | A text is not a telephone call; no private Do Not Call claim for texts |
| Ninth Circuit | Howard v. Republican National Committee, 13 January 2026 | 227(b) | A text message is properly deemed a call |
| E.D. Pennsylvania | Pero v. Brown-Daub Chevrolet of Nazareth, 17 June 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Texts are telephone calls under the Do Not Call provisions |
| N.D. Georgia | Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings, 12 February 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Texts are not telephone calls; on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit |
| N.D. Georgia | Radvansky v. 1-800-Flowers.com, 17 February 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Motion to dismiss granted |
| M.D. Florida | Lopresti v. Nouveau Essentials Marketing, 26 February 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Magistrate judge recommended judgment for the defendant |
| W.D. Missouri | Rush v. Selectquote Insurance Services, 30 July 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Followed the view that texts are excluded, per Mintz |
| M.D. North Carolina | Card v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, 3 September 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Followed the view that texts are excluded, per Mintz |
| S.D. Florida | Anthony v. Brian Marketing Group, 11 September 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Followed the view that texts are excluded, per Mintz |
| M.D. Alabama | Conrad v. Hart Consumer Products, 16 September 2026 | 227(c)(5) | Followed the view that texts are excluded, per Mintz |
What did the Seventh Circuit decide in Steidinger?
It held that section 227(c)(5) does not permit plaintiffs to sue for the receipt of unwanted text messages, and affirmed the dismissal of a class action.
The plaintiffs received marketing texts and calls from Blackstone Medical Services urging them to buy home sleep tests. They said the messages continued after they replied STOP or added their numbers to the National Do Not Call Registry. They filed a consolidated class action in the Central District of Illinois under the TCPA and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act.
Blackstone moved to dismiss the federal claims on one ground: the section the plaintiffs sued under, 227(c)(5), creates a private right of action for telephone calls, and texts are not calls. The district court agreed, dismissed the federal claims and declined to keep the Florida claim.
The appeal was argued on 21 May 2026 and decided on 14 July 2026 by Judges Kirsch, Pryor and Maldonado. Judge Kirsch wrote that the appeal turned on a single issue, whether text messages are telephone calls within the meaning of 227(c)(5), and the panel affirmed. A footnote records that the plaintiffs did not argue their suit could proceed on the alleged voice calls alone, so that argument was treated as waived.
What was the reasoning?
The court read telephone call as it was understood in 1991 and gave weight to the fact that Congress used a broader term, telephone solicitation, elsewhere in the same subsection.
The opinion starts with ordinary meaning at the time of enactment. It cites a 1991 dictionary defining a telephone as an instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance and a call as getting into communication by telephone. From that it concludes a telephone call in 1991 referred to communication by sound, and that text messages do not reproduce sounds. The court accepted that statutes can reach new technology, and said the march of technology alone does not fix the meaning of the words.
The second step is structure. Sections 227(c)(1) to (c)(4), which direct the FCC to make rules and create the registry, speak of telephone solicitations. The statute defines that term as the initiation of a telephone call or message. Section 227(c)(5), by contrast, gives a private claim to a person who has received more than one telephone call. The court presumed that the different term carries a different meaning, and that call and message refer to different forms of communication.
To decide which one a text is, the court looked at how Congress treated faxes in 1991. The statute regulates sending a message by fax machine, which is text sent by an electronic device over a telephone line. Congress called those messages. The court concluded modern texts are better understood as messages too.
The opinion closes on purpose. Congress found that telemarketing calls could tie up lines needed for emergencies. Spam texts do not pose that risk, the court wrote, so it is at least reasonable that the private claim covers calls and not messages.
- Ordinary meaning in 1991: a telephone call was communication by sound
- Different words: telephone solicitation includes a call or message; 227(c)(5) says telephone call only
- The fax analogy: Congress treated text sent over a phone line as a message
- Other amendments: Congress added text messages to 227(e) in 2018 and left 227(c)(5) unchanged
- Purpose: the emergency-line concern behind the 1991 act does not apply to texts
Why did the FCC's view not control?
Because the Supreme Court held in 2025 that courts are not bound by the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA, and the Seventh Circuit found the FCC's registry rule rested on a different paragraph of the statute.
The FCC has long read call to include text messages, and in a rule published in January 2024 it extended National Do Not Call Registry protections to texts. The plaintiffs relied on both.
The court gave two answers. First, the registry was created under 227(c)(3), which speaks of telephone solicitations. An FCC rule made under that paragraph does not tell a court what telephone call means in 227(c)(5). The court also noted that the FCC has not made a rule defining the term for the purposes of 227(c)(5).
Second, even if the FCC's reading did bear on the question, the court said it was not bound by it. It cited McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates v. McKesson Corp., a 2025 Supreme Court decision, for the rule that a court interprets the statute as courts traditionally do, giving appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation. The plaintiffs argued that appropriate respect meant deference. The court disagreed and reviewed the statutory question afresh.
What did the ruling leave untouched?
It left the autodialer section, FCC enforcement, voice calls and state law where they were.
The opinion is careful about its limits. It distinguishes the earlier cases that called texts calls, including its own, on the ground that they concerned 227(b), a section with a broadly framed private right of action for any violation of the subsection. It observes that the Supreme Court assumed in two cases that 227(b) reaches texts without deciding the point.
It leaves agency enforcement in place. The final paragraph says repeated, unwanted text messages are a nuisance that may be curbed through agency action under other provisions of section 227, which the court leaves undisturbed. The FCC's regulation applying the registry and calling-hours rules to texts is still published.
It does not decide any state-law question. The Florida claim in the case was dismissed without a ruling on its merits when the district court declined supplemental jurisdiction. Florida's statute defines a telephonic sales call to include a text message in its own words.
| Type of claim or rule | Effect of Steidinger | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Private Do Not Call claim over texts, 227(c)(5) | Foreclosed in the Seventh Circuit | Binding on federal courts in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin |
| Private Do Not Call claim over voice calls | None | The section still covers telephone calls |
| Autodialer and prerecorded-voice claims, 227(b) | None | The court distinguished 227(b) as differently worded |
| FCC enforcement of its Do Not Call rules for texts | None | The court said agency action remains available |
| State laws that name text messages | None | The Florida claim was not decided |
| Quiet-hours and internal do-not-call claims over texts | Not addressed by name | These are brought under the same section, so the reasoning is likely to be argued; Mintz reports courts applying it to internal list claims |
Where do other courts stand?
District courts are divided, with decisions on both sides before and after Steidinger, and the Eleventh Circuit has an appeal pending.
Two days after the ruling, Fox Rothschild counted roughly 18 district court decisions since McLaughlin holding that texts are calls and about 11 holding they are not. On the first side it names Pero v. Brown-Daub Chevrolet of Nazareth, decided 17 June 2026 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which read the statute's call or message language as showing that Congress meant to reach more than voice calls.
On the other side, Faegre Drinker reported in March 2026 that district courts in the Eleventh Circuit were increasingly finding no private right of action for texts, naming two Northern District of Georgia decisions and a Middle District of Florida recommendation from February 2026. Mintz, writing on 28 September 2026, lists four more district decisions after Steidinger that excluded texts or cellular numbers from the Do Not Call claims, in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina and Missouri.
The next appellate ruling is expected from the Eleventh Circuit. Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings is on appeal there as No. 26-10837. K&L Gates expects the split to widen and considers a petition to the Supreme Court likely, especially after the Eleventh Circuit rules. We found no decision in that appeal as of 12 November 2026.
What does the split mean in practice?
The federal exposure for marketing texts now varies by where the recipient can sue, while the published rules and state statutes have not changed.
The first consequence is geographic. A private Do Not Call suit over texts cannot proceed in federal court in Illinois, Indiana or Wisconsin. In a district that follows Pero, the same facts state a claim. K&L Gates points out the difficulty of acting on that: a business often cannot tell where all of its contacts are located.
The second is that the rules a business works to are unchanged. The FCC's regulation still applies the registry to texts. State laws in Florida, Texas and elsewhere cover texts expressly. A sender that stops checking the registry for texts because of one circuit's ruling is relying on a litigation defense in three states and an open question everywhere else.
The third is about records. K&L Gates advises keeping strong consent records, honoring opt-outs promptly and monitoring state law. Those are the same facts a business would need to prove under either reading.
Congress could resolve it. Our research notes record a bill, H.R. 8311, introduced on 15 April 2026 and referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee, that would extend Do Not Call coverage and widen the private right of action. It has not advanced.
What to watch next
The Eleventh Circuit appeal, any petition to the Supreme Court, and whether the FCC or Congress acts.
An Eleventh Circuit decision agreeing with the Seventh would cover Florida, Georgia and Alabama. A decision going the other way would create a direct conflict between appeals courts on the same section.
The list below is what we will check when this post is next reviewed. None of these events has a fixed date.
- A ruling in Radvansky v. Kendo Holdings, Eleventh Circuit No. 26-10837
- A petition asking the Supreme Court to review Steidinger or a later decision
- District court rulings in the Second, Third, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, where no appeals court has addressed 227(c)(5)
- Movement on H.R. 8311 or a similar bill
Common questions
Are text messages considered calls under the TCPA?
Under the FCC's rules, yes. In the courts it depends on the section. Appeals courts including the Ninth Circuit treat texts as calls under the autodialer section, 227(b). The Seventh Circuit held in July 2026 that texts are not telephone calls under the private Do Not Call section, 227(c)(5).
What did Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services hold?
That 47 U.S.C. 227(c)(5) does not permit a person to sue over unwanted text messages, because a text is not a telephone call as that term was understood when the statute was enacted in 1991. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a class action on 14 July 2026.
Which states does the Seventh Circuit ruling cover?
Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. The decision binds federal district courts in those states. Courts elsewhere may find it persuasive or may disagree, and several have done each.
Can I still be sued for texting someone on the Do Not Call Registry?
Outside the Seventh Circuit, some district courts allow those claims and others dismiss them. State statutes that name text messages are a separate basis for suit, and the FCC can enforce its own rule. This post cannot say how a claim against a particular business would come out.
Does Steidinger affect autodialer claims under 227(b)?
No. The opinion distinguishes 227(b) as a differently worded section with a broader private right of action, and says its earlier cases about that section do not bear on the question it decided.
Is there a circuit split on whether texts are calls?
Lawyers describe one, with a qualification. The Ninth Circuit's January 2026 decision that a text is a call was about 227(b), and the Seventh Circuit's decision was about 227(c)(5). No second appeals court has yet ruled on 227(c)(5) itself. The Eleventh Circuit has an appeal pending.
Will the Supreme Court decide whether texts are calls?
Nobody knows. K&L Gates considers a petition likely, particularly after the Eleventh Circuit rules. As of 12 November 2026 we found no Eleventh Circuit decision, and the Supreme Court has not taken up the question.
Reviewed November 13, 2026
Consentra is software. Nothing on this site is legal advice, and using Consentra does not by itself make a business compliant with any law or carrier rule. Whether a rule applies to your business is a question for your counsel.
Sources
- US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398, slip opinion hosted by Duane Morris (14 July 2026)
- Legal Information Institute: 47 U.S.C. 227, Restrictions on use of telephone equipment (opened November 2026)
- Legal Information Institute: 47 CFR 64.1200, Delivery restrictions (opened November 2026)
- Fox Rothschild: Courts divided over whether text messages are telephone calls under TCPA (16 July 2026)
- K&L Gates: Litigation Minute, Seventh Circuit rules that text messages are not telephone calls under the TCPA (5 August 2026)
- Mintz: Do text messages still trigger TCPA national and internal do-not-call claims? (28 September 2026)
- Faegre Drinker: Courts in Eleventh Circuit find no private right of action under 227(c) for texts (17 March 2026)
- Kelley Drye: Seventh Circuit holds text messages are not calls under TCPA DNC provision (15 July 2026)
- Florida Legislature: Fla. Stat. 501.059, Telephone solicitation (2026 Florida Statutes)
- Congress.gov: H.R. 8311, Protecting American Consumers from Robocalls Act, 119th Congress
